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In the October 11, 2010 issue of New Yorker Magazine, Ryan Lizza
sheds light on recent congressional efforts to pass comprehensive energy
and climate legislation. Senators John Kerry, Lindsey Graham, and Joseph
Lieberman (respectively, a Democrat, a Republican, and an Independent)
worked for months to craft a mutually tolerable bill.1 However, under
the draconian rules of the United States Senate, a controversial bill
cannot move to a floor vote without the support of at least 60 senators.
This meant that the bill’s sponsors needed to focus more on the whims
of a handful of senators in the minority than they did on the majority of
the members, who would likely support anything acceptable to the
authors.2 Lizza describes a process under which the bill’s proponents
sacrificed major provisions in the legislation in the hopes of buying
support from certain swing senators.3 This process only succeeded in
weakening the bill without securing additional votes.4 Eventually, the
whole effort collapsed.5
Given that a multi-partisan effort to move a bill failed in the last
Senate, and the grid lock of the Congress that followed, the odds of passing
comprehensive climate and energy legislation in the are all the more
dismal. Yet, the underlying problems creating the need for energy
reform persist. The United States has yet to make a firm commitment to
long-term greenhouse gas reduction, and its energy policy continues to be
fragmented and scattered. Meanwhile, China and various European
nations appear to be taking the lead in producing and selling renewable
power equipment.
In this context, perhaps it is time to reconsider the congressional
approach to energy policy—to find the pieces that have worked and to
abandon the ones that continue to fail. The greatest failure has been one
of political will to prescribe a uniform national approach. The more
promising avenue likely carves a path of cooperative federalism. Such
an approach would leave to the states the primary responsibility for
developing and executing a particular program, while imposing significant
requirements to be followed in the discharge of that responsibility.
It is in the states that hope remains for action consistent with our
environmental challenges. Congress has a critical role to play in bringing
out the best that each state has to offer. This paper considers the
opportunity to apply proven approaches for sharing responsibility with
the states to one of the critical components of a new energy policy—
1. Ryan Lizza, As the World Burns, NEW YORKER, Oct. 11, 2010, http://www.
newyorker.com/reporting/2010/10/11/101011fa_fact_lizza.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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using renewable electric generation in lieu of power plants fired by coal,
oil, or natural gas. This policy is most often expressed in the form of a
“renewable portfolio standard” or a “renewable energy standard” imposed
on the utilities and other entities providing electric power service.
I. WHY RENEWABLE POWER IS SO IMPORTANT
Renewable power6 does not answer all of our climate concerns, but it
is a critical component of any ambitious effort to reduce electric powerrelated greenhouse gas emissions. Assume an interest in reducing such
emissions to 80 percent below current levels. One way to reach that number
would be to cut emissions by as much as 50 percent through efficiency
improvements, take half of the emissions out of the fuel mix through
fuel substitution, and achieve additional reductions through behavioral
change. If there is less fuel substitution, then efficiency and behavioral
gains must be greater. If we remain more inefficient, there must be even
more fuel substitution.
There is great potential for efficiency gains in all sectors.7 The
conversion time will be quite lengthy, and the upfront cost for even
extremely cost-effective substitutions will be high.8 In addition, while
efficiency gains remain the most important option, energy demand will
continue to be considerable.9 Fuel substitution must play a significant
role. The transportation sector offers the greatest challenge for fuel
substitution. Current ethanol programs only displace a small fraction of
liquid fossil fuel use and produce little or no net greenhouse gas
reduction.10 A dramatic shift in transportation fuel use may require
substituting electricity for gasoline, which will likely increase the demand
for electric power. This makes fuel substitution in the power sector all
the more crucial.
Half of the power generated in the United States is derived from the
use of coal—the single greatest source of stationary greenhouse gas

6. For the purposes of this discussion renewable power is generated with solar heat,
photovoltaics, wind, geothermal heat, small hydroelectric facilities, biomass, biofuels, or
offshore kinetic energy.
7. H ANNAH C HOI G RANADE ET AL ., M C K INSEY & C O., U NLOCKING ENERGY
EFFICIENCY IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 9 (2009).
8. Id. at viii.
9. Id. at 48.
10. Matthew L. Wald, A Bit More Ethanol in the Gas Tank, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/14/business/energy-environment/14ethanol.html.
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emissions.11 Burning domestic natural gas produces about half the
greenhouse gas emissions resulting from burning coal.12 Assuming that
these overly-simplistic numbers apply to all electric generation, replacing
all of the power generated at coal plants with power generated at natural
gas plants would reduce power-related greenhouse gas emissions by 25
percent, which is simply not enough to get the job done.13 But the largescale conversion to electric vehicles would increase the demand for
electricity. Meeting this new demand by burning natural gas would reduce
greenhouse gas emissions in the transportation sector, but increase
emissions from electric generation.
These results leave us with two choices to accomplish our goal of
reducing greenhouse gas emissions: capture and store the carbon dioxide
otherwise released through combustion, or increase our reliance on
power generation that is not dependent on fossil fuel consumption—
even when that fossil fuel is cleaner-burning natural gas. Carbon capture
and sequestration is no panacea. It is energy-intensive and requires large
supplies of water.14 Infrastructure needs are great, and carbon sequestration
will do nothing to alleviate the environmental devastation related to coal
mining and processing. Many point to increased reliance on nuclear
power as at least part of the answer, since greenhouse gas emissions related
to nuclear fuel processing and power generation are relatively small.
Yet, the promised nuclear renaissance remains more a reflection of
engineering optimism than commercial reality. Proponents have always
said that nuclear power could be safe, fast, and economical. Nonetheless,
radioactive waste storage challenges remain unresolved; the lead-time
for planning, permitting, and constructing new plants remains long; and
costs remain high.15
11. Dep’t. of Energy, Fossil Energy: A Brief Overview of Coal, http://fossil.energy.
gov/education/energylessons/coal/gen_coal.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2011).
12. Using imported natural gas results in greater greenhouse gas emissions, but
that is a discussion for another time.
13. Michael Graham Richard, Some U.S. Utilities Starting to Replace Coal with
Natural Gas, T REE H UGGER , Dec. 1, 2010, http://www.treehugger.com/files/2010/12/
utilities-replacing-coal-power-plants-with-natural-gas.php.
14. Fossil Energy Office of Commc’ns, Carbon Capture Research, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, http://www.http://fossil.energy.gov/programs/sequestration/
capture/index.html (last updated Feb. 9, 2011).
15. The recent nuclear power crisis at Fukushima Daichi in Japan will, at a minimum,
add to the uncertainty related to additional nuclear power development in the United States as
stakeholders debate the significance of the cooling system failures at those plants. In
addition, the potential role in the Fukushima accident of on-site spent fuel storage will likely
lead to greater scrutiny of such storage strategies at nuclear power plants throughout the
world. This adds a new element of uncertainty to both new plant licensing and the
relicensing of existing plants. See Zulima Palacio, After Fukushima, Nations Put Nuke
Plant Development On Hold, VOICES OF AMERICA (Apr. 6, 2011) http://www.voanews.
com/english/news/science-technology/After-Fukushima-Nations-Put-Nuke-Plant-Development
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While many of these observations could apply to various renewable
energy options as well, there have been great and consistent gains in the
efficiency of wind turbines, the cost of solar photovoltaics, and financial
support for the build-out of large central-station solar installations. A
very significant challenge relates to the successful management of
intermittent generation from solar and wind facilities when that power is
introduced to the grid. In the short-term, versatile gas-fired peaking
plants can contribute to system stability. In the long-term, energy storage
systems of various kinds16 must take on a major role as part of utility
infrastructure.
Nonetheless, the conclusion is inevitable: no single energy option will
break our reliance on coal, oil, and gas. We need to become as efficient
as practicable in all aspects of energy usage and pursue all promising
ways of displacing the remaining demand for fossil fuels. On the supply
side, renewable sources deserve the greatest emphasis due to largely
inexhaustible fuel supplies and stable operating costs, as well as
opportunities to minimize conventional pollutants, enhance safety, and
reduce the burden on future generations in the form of stored carbon
dioxide and high-level nuclear waste.
II. WHERE RENEWABLE GENERATION USE CURRENTLY
STANDS IN THE STATES
Policies supporting the use of renewable sources for electric generation
are promising in some states, but uneven nationally. Twenty-nine states
and the District of Columbia have adopted some type of mandate related
to utility reliance on renewable generation.17 Although precise names
may differ, these can be referred to generally as Renewable Portfolio
Standards. Some states’ standards are much more ambitious than others.
For instance, while California law calls for achieving 33 percent renewable
power by the year 2020, its neighbor, Arizona, seeks 15 percent by
-On-Hold-119361329.html; Prachi Patel, Fukushima’s Impact on Nuclear Power, IEEE
SPECTRUM: TECH TALK (Mar. 22, 2011), http://www. spectrum.ieee.org/tech-talk/energy/
nuclear/fukushimas-impact-on-nuclear-power.
16. Promising technologies include advanced batteries, compressed air, hydroelectric
pumped storage, ice, and other forms of storing the benefits of electric generation for
later use. See BRAD ROBERTS & JESSICA HARRISON, ELEC. ADVISORY COMM., ENERGY
STORAGE ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES ELECTRICITY GRID 2-3 (2011).
17. Renewable Power & Energy Efficiency Market: Renewable Portfolio Standard,
FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM., http://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/othr-mkts/renew/
othr-rnw-rps.pdf (last updated Aug. 11, 2011).
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2025.18 Minnesota requires 25 percent renewable power by 2025, while
Wisconsin only requires 10 percent by 2015.19 In addition, states define
qualifying renewable generation in inconsistent ways—some states allow
municipal waste incinerators to qualify, some count generation from
existing large-scale hydroelectric dams, and some allow energy
efficiency improvements to qualify.20
What is perhaps most noteworthy is that a significant number of states
with either no renewable portfolio standard or with weak requirements
are places with above-average reliance on coal-fired power.21 It is in
those states where the substitution of renewable power for conventional
generation could have the greatest impact on greenhouse gas reductions.
Consider Pennsylvania, one of the four most coal-dependent states in the
nation. While its standard calls for 18 percent reliance on alternatives by
2020, only 8 percent must come from wind, solar, small hydropower,
geothermal, or biomass (and this portion can include coalmine methane).22
The remaining 10 percent could come from waste coal, demand side
management, large hydropower, municipal solid waste, or coal integrated
gasification combined cycle.23 None of these options is considered
“renewable” for the purposes of programs in the more ambitious states.
Indiana, one of the ten most coal-dependent states, has no renewable
portfolio standard requirement at all.24 The top tier of coal-dependent
states includes Georgia, who spends the most on coal imports and has no
standard in place, North Carolina, who has a low 12.5% standard, Texas,
and Florida, who has no statute in place as well.25
In sum, 21 states (including many of those that are most dependent on
coal power) impose no firm requirements for their electric utilities to
incorporate renewable power, while many other states impose standards
that may fail to produce much renewable power.

18. RYAN WISER ET AL., SUPPORTING SOLAR POWER IN RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO
STANDARDS: EXPERIENCE FROM THE UNITED STATES 5 (2010), available at http://eetd.lbl.
gov/ea/ems/reports/lbnl-3984e.pdf.
19. Id.
20. See Renewable & Alternative Energy Portfolio Standards, PEW CENTER ON
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 1-5, 7 http://www.pewclimate.org/sites/default/modules/usmap/
pdf.php?file=5907 (last updated Aug. 25, 2011).
21. See JEFF DEYETTE & BARBARA FREESE, BURNING COAL, BURNING CASH 2
(Union of Concerned Scientists 2010).
22. See id. at 3; Renewable & Alternative Energy Portfolio Standards, supra note
20, at 7.
23. Renewable & Alternative Energy Portfolio Standards, supra note 20, at 7.
24. See Deyette & Freese, supra note 21, at 8; Renewable & Alternative Energy
Portfolio Standards, supra note 20, at 3.
25. Deyette & Freese, supra note 21, at 8; Renewable & Alternative Energy Portfolio
Standards, supra note 20, at 2, 6, 8.
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III. THE APPEAL OF A FEDERAL RENEWABLE ENERGY STANDARD
A federal renewable energy standard would not stand alone among
federal renewable power initiatives, as there are various tax credits, loan
guarantees, and research and development programs already in place.
However, while existing federal programs are designed to promote market
growth and technological breakthroughs, a procurement standard for the
nation’s utilities would ensure substantial and growing demand. In addition,
with such a standard in place, all of the nation’s electric utilities would
be required to plan for and to incorporate a particular amount of
renewable power.
A federal standard would offer some degree of consistency from state
to state and create mandates where there are none. It could facilitate the
sale of renewable power among the states by setting uniform rules of
trade and would manifest a national commitment to developing and
maintaining broader markets for renewable generation and its attendant
technologies. The short-term result could be an increase in investor
confidence. In the long-term, proponents hope to see a significant
increase in green sector employment and the refinement of other federal
policies to be consistent with the mandate. Since there is no equivalent
oil or coal mandate, a long-term commitment to renewable power
development should cause policy makers to question the wisdom of
continuing to subsidize fossil fuels while at the same time trying to
displace their use with renewable alternatives.
IV. WHY THE NATION CANNOT RELY ON CONGRESS TO CREATE A
STRONG STANDARD
Since 2001, Congress has failed repeatedly in its efforts to create a
national renewable energy standard.26 Provisions to that effect have
passed the House and the Senate, but never both in the same bill.27 These
provisions have failed when Republicans controlled both houses, when
Democrats controlled both houses, and when each party dominated one

26. See, e.g., Benjamin K. Sovacool & Christopher Cooper, Congress Got It
Wrong: The Case for a National Renewable Portfolio Standard and Implications for
Policy, 3 ENVT’L & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 85, 86-89, 148 (2008).
27. Bryan Walsh, Can Congress Pass a Renewable Energy Standard?, TIME
ECOCENTRIC BLOG (Jul. 26, 2010, 7:08 PM), http://ecocentric.blogs.time.com/2010/07/26/
can-congress-pass-a-renewable-energy-standard/.
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chamber. They have failed when incorporated as part of comprehensive
energy legislation and when they stood alone.
Equally as discouraging, the renewable energy standards proposed in
recent bills have been less than inspirational, no doubt reflecting a desire
on the part of the bills’ authors to overcome persistent opposition. A
close examination of one of the most recent examples—S.3813, a bill
introduced in late 2010 but not passed—is instructive. While California
aimed for 20 percent renewable electricity by 2010 and 33 percent by
2020, this bill promised 15 percent by 2020.28 It also offered numerous
ways for a utility to avoid ever needing to achieve 15 percent of its
demand with renewable energy. Here are some of the ways:
The first way out comes in the answer to the question: 15 percent of
what? While California serves as an example, there are similar provisions
in many other states. California requires 33 percent of demand to be met
with renewable sources. Period. Before calculating its 15 percent amount,
S.3813 would have allowed the utility to subtract from its total demand
the output of any hydroelectric plant serving its customers, the output of
any new nuclear plant, the incremental output from any existing nuclear
plant, the output of any coal plant employing carbon sequestration, and
the output of any pumped storage facility29 (regardless of how
nonrenewable the source of power pumping that water might be).30 The
federal standard would have been further diluted by the inclusion of
domestic trash as renewable fuel.31 In most states with their own renewable
standards, garbage, if it is allowed at all, must first be converted to a
clean-burning gas. The federal legislation imposed no such requirement.
Another path of avoidance came from the fact that, under the bill, all
renewable sources were not created equal. The way a utility would have
shown compliance with the standard was by submitting credit
certificates for all of the renewable power it generated or purchased and
for all of the credits the utility might have bought from other renewable
energy producers, even for power from sources that would never have
delivered power to the utility’s customers.32 If a utility served a billion
kilowatt hours of electricity in 2020 (and had not reduced its renewable
energy obligations in other ways), it would have needed to submit
certificates equal to 150 million kilowatt hours. But the amount of
28. S. 3813, 111th Cong. § 610 (2010).
29. A pumped storage facility relies on off-peak electric generation to pump water
from a lower-elevation reservoir to one at a higher elevation. At times when electric
demand is higher, the operator can release the stored water to spin a turbine and generate
electricity as the water makes its way downhill.
30. Id.
31. See id.
32. Id.
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renewable power generated might have been quite a bit less. That is
because renewable power would earn double credits if it came from
Indian land, triple credits if it came from generators smaller than one
megawatt, and triple credits if it involved algae.33 And some biomass
generators could have produced up to 1.5 credits per kilowatt-hour if
they were especially efficient.34 It is not possible to predict how much
renewable power would actually have been generated under this plan,
but it might have been quite a bit less than 15 percent of the power sold
to the utility’s customers.
There is more, however. Utility compliance could also have come
from the results of energy efficiency programs, or from the efficiency
gains resulting from combined heat and power projects.35 Those are
power plants that use waste steam from some industrial or commercial
project to generate electricity—a process that can save a lot of fuel; but
that fuel might be natural gas, oil, or even coal.
All of the measures that would have provided extra credits, reduced
demand, or promoted efficiency are good things. The problem was that
they were all mixed together in the bill with the renewable energy goals.
In the end, it was impossible to predict the amount of renewable power
that would have resulted from the proposed federal standard. It is very
safe to say that in many places, renewable power produced to comply
with this federal law would have been much less than 15 percent by
2020. All this, while California and many other states aim higher in
terms of renewable energy use over time and employ compliance
formulae that are comparatively pure and simple.36 It should be noted
that another senator responded to S.3813 by proposing a substitute bill
that would have allowed credit for power from new nuclear plants and
new coal plants incorporating at least 60 percent carbon sequestration, as
well as other non-renewable sources.37 While the initial bill would have
subtracted the output of such resources from the denominator in
calculating the 15 percent compliance, the substitute bill would have
added that output to the numerator—making it a much more effective
way to avoid using more renewable power.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Supra note 18, at 3-9.
S. 20, 111th Cong. (2010).
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In his State of the Union Address in both 2011 and 2012, President
Obama appears to have picked up where the substitute bill left off: by
proposing a goal of relying on clean energy sources for 80 percent of the
electric power to be generated in 2035. This proposal would include
nuclear power, natural gas plants, and some coal-fired plants within the
definition of clean fuel. Since it would allow only partial credit for gas
and coal-fired power, the clean energy proposal would likely lead to an
increase in renewable generation in at least some states.38 However,
history suggests that if Congress were ultimately to adopt a standard, it
would be significantly lower than the 80 percent proposed by the
President. How this proposal would affect renewable power deployment
in any particular state, and whether the goals would be enforceable, are
unknown. What seems evident is that states would have creative options
for coming into compliance using non-renewable resources. It is also
conceivable that this new proposal will silence or overwhelm efforts to
develop a renewable, energy-specific national standard.
These proposals raise a fundamental question: Is any kind of federal
standard better than none? There is no easy answer. At first glance, it
seems that most of the federal standards proposed so far would not have
preempted more ambitious state standards, which is good. Yet, it is in
the crafting of rules implementing the law that we would find out
whether the federal program would undercut efforts in the states. The
most recent federal bill recognized a number of important options worthy of
promotion, including energy efficiency and combined heat and power.39
However, by lumping them together with renewable sources, the bill
fails to recognize that each pathway is important on its own. As part of
an effort to cut greenhouse gas emissions far below current levels, we
need to make power use as efficient as possible and build out renewable
generating capacity and rely on combined heat and power. We cannot
take a little from here and there and hope to make a meaningful dent in
greenhouse gas emissions. In addition, a 15 percent target is too low—
especially considering all of the carve-outs the bill would allow for
nuclear power, coal power, and other non-renewable sources. Even with
deference to higher state standards, a weak federal program could put
pressure on the states to lower their expectations.
38. In an online town hall meeting the day after the 2011 speech, Energy Secretary
Steven Chu said that the definition of clean fuels needs to be “fleshed out” with Congress.
Therefore, the nature of the proposal remains unclear (http://energy.gov/ videos/sec-chuonline-town-hall). The White House claims that the nation already relies on clean energy for
40 percent of its electric power. Since the role of renewable power is currently much
smaller than that, the Administration’s definition of clean power must include existing
resources such as large-scale hydroelectric, nuclear power, and natural gas generation.
39. S. 3813, 111th Cong. § 610 (2010).
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Many environmental and renewable energy industry groups supported
S.3813; although, perhaps not with great enthusiasm.40 With the bill’s
passage, the United States would have had its first national renewable
energy mandate to apply to non-governmental entities. It would have led
to a uniform system for tracking renewable energy credits and provided
some hope for later amendments, leading to a more meaningful standard.
Yet, even if an adopted federal standard were later improved, efforts in
the interim might have been misdirected. In addition, once an industry
sector won a concession—such as coal technologies being treated as if
they were renewable and others being allowed to receive multiple credits
per unit of production—how easy would it be to reverse that concession?
V. WHY THE NATION AND THE WORLD CANNOT RELY ON
THE STATES, ACTING ALONE
When it comes to local renewable energy resources, not all states are
created equal. The Western states are blessed with a rich bouquet of
renewable power options, with abundant desert sun, promising geothermal
sites, and plentiful wind both on and off shore. The upper Midwest is
famous for its stiff winds. Eastern states have high potential for power
generated from biomass. Yet, the leaders in many states are left worrying
that the lack of local renewable resources could place them at an
economic disadvantage in the face of renewable power mandates. This is
the concern, despite studies that suggest that every state could meet at
least 20 percent, and most states could meet far in excess of a quarter of
their power needs with just homegrown wind and rooftop photovoltaic
resources.41 Considering this concern and the fact that many states rely
on coal power and the coal industry, it is not surprising that some states
are reluctant to commit to ambitious renewable energy goals without
pressure from the rest of the nation.
Even if states were uniformly motivated to develop renewable power,
there are at least two aspects of renewable energy mandates that could
benefit from federal involvement. Those are the renewable energy credit

40. Clients Lobbying on S.3813, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/
billsum.php?id=119256&lname=S.3813 (last visited Sept. 06, 2011).
41. See, e.g., John Farrell & David Morris, Energy Self-Reliant States Second and
Expanded Edition, NEW RULES PROJECT (Oct. 2010), http://www.newrules.org/energy/
publications/energy-selfreliant-states-second-and-expanded-edition.
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process and the development of rules within a given state that might
interfere with interstate commerce.
Renewable Energy Credits (often referred to as “RECs”) are the vehicle
through which utilities demonstrate compliance with renewable power
mandates. The staff of the California Public Utilities Commission
defines RECs as follows:
A REC confers to its holder a claim on the renewable attributes of one unit of
energy generated from a renewable resource. RECs are “created” by a
renewable generator simultaneous to the production of electricity and can
subsequently be sold separately from the underlying energy. This gives rise to
two scenarios: one in which a renewable generator sells [its] energy and the
credit bundled together, and another, in which the energy is sold to one buyer
and the renewable credit is unbundled and sold to another. In the case of the
former, the buyer receives both the energy and the credit, while, in the latter,
one buyer receives the energy, which has been “stripped” of its renewable
attributes, while another buyer purchases the renewable credit.
In the context of the [Renewable Portfolio Standard], the ability to separate the
energy from the renewable attributes gives [utilities and other] load-serving
entities with limited access to renewable energy resources the ability to
purchase RECs to be applied toward their renewable energy obligations from
renewable generators, irrespective of where those generators are located or
where the energy itself is ultimately delivered. This allows [those load-serving
entities] to avoid the costs associated with accommodating physical delivery of
the underlying energy and/or the costs associated with remarketing the energy if
delivery is not an option. By removing these transaction costs, obligated entities
are given greater flexibility in terms of how and what resources they rely on to
achieve their [renewable power] goals, thereby reducing their costs of
compliance.42

If regulators allow utilities to demonstrate compliance with the
submission of unbundled credits, the integrity of the program depends
on those credits being real (reflecting power actually generated and
delivered to a grid somewhere), verifiable, and counted only once. In order
to ensure that the credits have these qualities, states allowing for the use
of tradable credits have established electronic certificate tracking systems.
There are several such systems in operation in different parts of the
country. Although there are voluntary efforts to coordinate data collection
and use among the various systems, each operates under its own rules. A
single, centrally-managed national credit tracking system would help to
ensure that credits traded across state and regional lines were of consistently
high quality.
In addition, as states develop and modify their programs in an effort to
maximize renewable energy deployment and stimulate local economic

42. A NDREW S CHWARTZ , C AL . P UB . U TIL . C OMM ’ N , R ENEWABLE ENERGY
CERTIFICATES AND THE CALIFORNIA RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARD PROGRAM 7
(2006), http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/word_pdf/REPORT/55606.doc.
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development, it is likely that they will be encumbered by federal
constitutional limits, stemming from the Dormant Commerce Clause,
when trying to design the most successful program. The Dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine derives from the negative implications of the
Interstate Commerce Clause that gives Congress the power “to regulate
Commerce . . . among the several States.”43 As interpreted by the U.S.
Supreme Court, Congress’ sole authority in this arena implies that states
are forbidden from passing legislation that improperly burdens or
discriminates against interstate commerce by providing differential
treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests.44
Some have argued that if an individual state imposed an in-state
preference or mandate for renewable energy facilities in its Renewable
Portfolio Standard or established renewable energy credit rules that
might create disadvantages for out-of-state generators, the state’s actions
would violate the Dormant Commerce Clause.45
Long-standing Supreme Court jurisprudence holds that Congress can
authorize state regulations that, without such Congressional action,
would otherwise violate Dormant Commerce Clause principles.46 The
right kind of federal action to protect states from Dormant Commerce
Clause claims related to renewable energy standards could help states in
their efforts to develop more effective programs and potentially encourage
states that have thus far not developed renewable energy mandates to do
so.
VI. WHAT WE CAN LEARN FROM THE PUBLIC UTILITY
REGULATORY POLICY ACT OF 1978
In 1978, when Congress first took steps to encourage utility-based
renewable energy development, it did not choose to mandate a uniform
quantity of development across the nation. Instead, in the Public Utility
Regulatory Policy Act (“PURPA”), Congress directed each state to
establish a program under which its regulated utilities would be required

43.
44.
45.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951).
Elizabeth Catlin, Commerce Clause Challenge to Renewable Portfolio Standards,
RENEWABLE ENERGY L. BLOG (Apr. 30, 2010), http://renewableenergylaw.blogspot.com/
2010/04/commerce-clause-challenge-to-renewable.html.
46. See, e.g., Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 12 How. 299, 321 (1852); In re Rahrer,
140 U.S. 545, 561–62 (1891).
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to purchase power produced at certain qualifying facilities47 and to pay
those facilities for the power they produced at the utility’s avoided cost
(the amount the utility would have paid to purchase the same amount of
power elsewhere). Each state could administer its own program and was
empowered to determine its utilities’ avoided cost. At its peak, this
program was credited with resulting in 12,000 megawatts of installed
renewable energy capacity in the United States.48 Some states were
much more successful in attracting participants than others; California
led the way, with 6,100 megawatts of installed capacity.49 Although the
program is now past its peak, the Pacific Gas & Electric Company
reports that a quarter of its current power supply comes from qualifying
facilities.50 Southern California Edison (second in size only to Pacific
Gas & Electric) reports that a third of its power comes from qualifying
facilities.51
PURPA changed expectations about the sources of electric power. It
opened electric markets to non-utility generators—a process that was
taken to a new level with the passage of the Energy Policy Act of 1992.52
That law created a class of providers called “merchant generators,”
which could include power generated with any type of fuel and would be
assured non-discriminatory access to the transmission grid.53 Together,
these acts changed the electric power landscape without forcing any state
to meet predetermined quotas.54
These two acts enjoyed broad support in Congress. PURPA passed in
the Senate 76-1355 and in the House of Representatives 231-168.56 The
Energy Policy Act of 1992 passed 381-37 in the House57 and 93-3 in the
Senate.58 In comparison, efforts to impose specific renewable energy
requirements on the states have received split votes and have never
passed in both bodies of Congress.

47. Cogenerators, as well as small renewable energy power facilities (no larger than 80
megawatts).
48. MIGUEL MENDOCA, FEED-IN TARIFFS: ACCELERATING THE DEPLOYMENT OF
RENEWABLE ENERGY 61 (2007).
49. Id.
50. Qualifying Facilities, PAC. GAS & ELECTRIC, http://www.pge.com/b2b/energy
supply/qualifyingfacilities/facilities/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2011).
51. Qualifying Facilities Background, S. CAL. EDISON, http://www.sce.com/About
SCE/Regulatory/qualifyingfacilities/qfbackground.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2011).
52. JOSEPH P. TOMAIN & RICHARD D. CUDAHY, ENERGY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 271–
74 (2004).
53. Id. at 275–76.
54. Id. at 271–76.
55. 124. CONG. REC. 34780 (1978).
56. 124 CONG. REC. 38503 (1978).
57. 138 CONG. REC. 12725–26 (1992).
58. 138 CONG. REC. 20430 (1992).
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While there are many factors at play in a complex bill, it appears that
legislators from some states will strongly resist an approach that prescribes
specific fuel mix obligations.59 Programs that reflect a national standard
while allowing for considerable local flexibility seem to have a better
chance of success.
VII. A FORMULA FOR MAXIMIZING RENEWABLE POWER
DEVELOPMENT
The nation must rely on states to promote renewable power because
our system of laws leaves to the states many of the fundamental aspects
of electric generation planning, construction, and procurement. If the
federal government wants to speed the deployment of renewable resources,
it must require or otherwise motivate the individual states to take strong
action. There is little debate that to accomplish this, Congress must
accept certain political realities, including the disparate impact that
renewable energy development may have on the various states, the
interest in many states to continue promoting the use of coal and natural
gas, and Congress’ proven inability to enact an effective standard.
However, what Congress might be able to accomplish may also be the
best approach overall. Here are the elements of one approach that draws
on the most promising elements of cooperative federalism:
A. No Federal Standard
Congress could choose not to adopt a single, national, renewable
energy standard. History suggests that any such standard would be weak
and full of loopholes.
B. Require a State Standard
Short of establishing a national standard, Congress could insist that
each state develop its own. The federal government could set a deadline
for compliance and develop criteria for the state’s decision. Absent
timely state action, the federal government could impose a standard on
the state.

59. Robin Bravender, Lawmakers in 17 states step up opposition to EPA’s GHG
rules, PUBLIC WORKS (Mar. 30, 2010), http://www.pwmag.com/industry-news.asp?section
ID=760&articleID=1239414.
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C. Encourage Ambitious State Programs
Congress could offer various incentives for states to adopt and
implement more aggressive programs. For instance, Congress could
direct the Department of Energy to distribute renewable energy research
and development funds to the states based on the comparative goals,
timetables, and successful implementation of state renewable energy
standards. The law could allow the appropriate federal agency to grant a
Dormant Commerce Clause exemption to states with programs surpassing
certain standards. This would enable states with ambitious renewable
energy programs to design them in a manner intended to stimulate local
economic development and keep more energy dollars within the state.
D. Establish a National Renewable Energy Credit Program
Because of its broad authority related to interstate commerce, the
federal government is in the position best suited to create a unified
national system for tracking and trading renewable energy credits. With
a single national system ensuring that the renewable power underlying
the credits is real, delivered to the grid, and not counted more than once,
it would be easier to facilitate trades among the states and to ensure
accurate counting. Consistent credit definitions and trading rules are an
important way to ensure that the credit transactions in one state are not
diluting program effectiveness in another. For instance, if one state does
not count large-scale hydroelectric power as renewable for the purposes
of its program, a national credit program should ensure that a utility in a
second state cannot buy credits stemming from those hydroelectric
plants. Even with a national system, individual states should have the
ability to determine whether renewable energy credits can be used to
achieve program compliance and, if so, how.
E. Allow Feed-in Tariffs
Several states have considered the adoption of feed-in tariffs, which
would require utilities to purchase power from certain renewable energy
facilities at predetermined prices. Some envision that by setting those
prices at levels sufficient to make renewable generation profitable, its
development would soar. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
which regulates wholesale electric prices in interstate commerce and
oversees the implementation of the qualifying facilities program under
PURPA, has concluded that its authority in these areas preempts a state’s
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ability to invoke feed-in tariffs.60 To free the states to use any reasonable
tool to promote renewable energy development, recent failed legislation
has included language to permit state-initiated feed-in tariffs. New
legislation to promote renewable power could include such language as
well.
F. Require Separate Energy Efficiency Goals
Energy efficiency improvements and renewable power are not eitheror choices—we need to pursue both. In addition to requiring states to set
a renewable energy standard, Congress could require states to set goals
and establish programs to make energy use more efficient. This could
include an aggressive effort aimed at rental buildings, since there is often
a split incentive between a building owner hesitant to invest in efficiency
improvements and a tenant forced to pay high utility bills that makes it
difficult to improve energy use in these structures. Because of a utility’s
inherent interest in promoting greater sales, Congress could require
states to consider third-party management of ratepayer-funded efficiency
programs.
G. Stabilize Tax Incentives
Congress has approved various investment and production tax credits
for renewable energy development and has always authorized them for
only a few years at a time.61 Critics have amply documented the
resulting on-and-off nature of project development. Congress could offer
greater long-term investment certainty by renewing the credits indefinitely
or, alternatively, setting clear criteria for phasing them out over time.
H. Require Integrated Resource Planning
Many options for responding to forecasted demand for electricity are
interchangeable. Utilities can satisfy demand by helping make energy
use more efficient, adjusting rates to shift demand to a better time of
day, adding transmission lines, or generating more power. To generate
electricity, there are many fuel choices—renewable and otherwise.

60.
61.
(2008).

Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 132 FERC ¶ 61,047 (July 15, 2010).
See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 § 120, 12 U.S.C.A. § 5230
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Nonetheless, most regulators and utilities consider these various options
in isolation from one another. This way, only the very lucky will end up
choosing the options that are the most efficient or the best for the
environment. Regulators can insist that the utilities take an integrated
approach to planning facilities and services, but most often they do not.
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission acknowledges the importance
of this state-level function but is not empowered to require it.62 Federal
law could establish planning standards and require that states implement
them.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The federal system employed in the United States offers many models
for cooperation between the federal government and the states in pursuit
of important policy objectives. Under the Clean Air Act, the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency can establish air quality standards and
delegate enforcement to the states.63 The Coastal Zone Management Act
empowers states to establish plans for management of ocean waters
close to shore and to have a say related to offshore projects that are in
federal jurisdictional waters. 64 The Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977 allows coal states to set and enforce their own
rules related to mountaintop mining.65 The Public Utilities Regulatory
Policy Act of 1978 sets some standards that the states must enforce or
risk federal intervention.66 It also requires states to consider, but not
necessarily adopt, various energy policy options related to rate-setting
and program offerings.
The political realities related to renewable energy policy suggest that
Congress will continue to fail in its effort to create a top-down,
prescribed set of goals for states to implement or will enact a law that is
weak or potentially counterproductive. A more promising approach may
be to insist that states adopt and implement programs that increase the
use of renewable electric generation and then offer incentives for the
states to make those programs as ambitious and effective as possible.

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
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See 18 C.F.R. pt. 35, 37 (2007); 131 FERC ¶ 61,253 at pt. 39 (June 17, 2010).
42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1977).
16 U.S.C. § 1454 (1996).
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1234-1328 (1977).
Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2645 (1978).

